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While the use of the internet and social media as a tool for extremists and terrorists has been well documented,
understanding the mechanisms at work has been much more elusive. This paper begins with a grounded theory
approach guided by a new theoretical approach to power that utilizes both terrorism cases and extremist social
media groups to develop an explanatory model of radicalization. Preliminary hypotheses are developed, explored
and refined in order to develop a comprehensive model which is then presented. This model utilizes and applies
concepts from social theorist Michel Foucault, including the use of discourse and networked power relations in
order to normalize and modify thoughts and behaviors. The internet is conceptualized as a type of institution in
which this framework of power operates and seeks to recruit and radicalize. Overall, findings suggest that the
explanatory model presented is a well suited, yet still incomplete in explaining the process of online radicalization.
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The use of the internet for terrorist recruitment and
operations has increased significantly in recent years. Part
of that expansion is an embracing of Western social media
including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. While this
phenomenon is well documented, what is more difficult to
determine due to limited research, are the mechanisms
and power relations that underlie this phenomenon of on-
line media used to promote radicalization which in some
cases can develop into terrorism. Currently, more trad-
itional models are utilized that look at concepts such as
psychological warfare, propaganda, indoctrination and
data mining [1]. Furthermore, narratives are viewed as an
important aspect of seduction for radicalization [1,2].
This paper examines these mechanisms and power
relations using the analytical framework from historian
and philosopher Michel Foucault; in particular, his earl-
ier work on psychiatric power [3]. Foucault’s approach
on psychiatric power focused on the asylum as an insti-
tution in order to modify and normalize extreme beha-
viors of those who were deemed as ‘mad’. What is
particularly significant from Foucault’s work is that
terms such as ‘madness’ and psychiatric discourses are
historically constituted through power relations [4].Correspondence: rtorok@our.ecu.edu.au
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in any medium, provided the original work is pNaturally the term ‘jihad’, should also be subject to his-
torical contextualization. However, it is not the intention
of this paper to reproduce what others have done, such
as a genealogy of Islamic ideas [5]. Rather, this paper
looks at how the institutional context for these dis-
courses has shifted, particularly in light of the ‘war on
terror’. Traditional ‘institutions’ such as training camps
are becoming increasingly difficult to operate given the
fact that they are continually targeted. In response, ter-
rorists have had to create new forms of institutions to
recruit, radicalize and train. Most significant is the use
of the online institution.
This shift to an online institution reflects one of the
most important strategic shifts and considers Foucault’s
methodology which relies on examining historical and
strategic shifts in practices as part of his methodological
approach [6,7]. Furthermore, these strategic shifts reflect
a transformation in power dynamics where the weaker
party in asymmetrical warfare can further disperse rela-
tionships through a giant open network. Coupled with
these shifts, it is also useful to include Foucault’s dis-
course of a ‘game’ when conceptualizing how either dis-
courses or practices change over time, and very much
parallels the online cyber environment that has its own
set of ‘rules’ [7]. Consequently it is expected that a shiftn Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
Torok Security Informatics 2013, 2:6 Page 2 of 10
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/2/1/6in practices will also involve a shift in the nature and
type of threat posed by terrorist groups.
The recent case of Arid Uka reveals a disturbing new
trend in online terrorism, that of the loner, with no clear
organizational affiliations or connections [8]. It marks a
shift away from training camps and small group affilia-
tions towards the online institution [9]. In other words,
‘The terrorists we should fear most are self-recruited
wannabes who find purpose in terror and comrades on
the Web.’ [9, p. 37]. So the key question is, what drives
this new breed of recruit? It is not poverty, not even ne-
cessarily religion, but a sense of marginalization and a
search for significance [9]. What is most concerning is
that the internet has become an online institution for
gathering and coordinating these marginalized individuals.
In recent years there has been an increasing reliance
on internet technologies primarily because they allow
good targeting of marginalized individuals, anonymity
and decentralization [10]. Originally the focus has been
on terrorist created web sites, now the focus has shifted
and spread to Western social media sites and forums
such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Yahoo groups
[10]. These forums offer distinct advantages in that
they enable terrorists to attract or lure individuals to a
cause as well as creating a mechanism to coordinate
attacks [10]. These media forums have become the new
institutions of radicalization and terrorism. It is within
these institutions where attitudes are shaped, rational-
ities are developed and individuals reshaped for the
path of jihad.
Methodology
This paper used qualitative data collection and ana-
lysis. Specifically, it followed a grounded theory model
of cyclic development in terms of hypothesis gener-
ation, testing and refinement [11]. The final explana-
tory model can be considered the result of hypothesis
generation resulting from a guiding theoretical frame-
work in conjunction with a literature analysis on
current research, social media research and post fact
terrorist cases.
Grim and others utilize the idea of qualitative hypoth-
esis testing in focus group interviews in order to test a
generated hypothesis [12]. In like fashion, this study uti-
lized several terrorist case profiles coupled with ten ex-
tremist groups using their social media group pages on
Facebook over a period of three months in order to
confirm, refine or modify the analytical framework
developed. The internet is regarded by researchers as
a cultural domain in its own right [13], and this is
harmonious with the exploratory notion of the inter-
net as an institution. Due to ethical boundaries, ana-
lysis was restricted to public domain group pages and
did not focus on personal profile pages. Continualdata generation, hypothesis refinement and checking were
conducted in order to achieve data saturation [12].
This study combined both pre terrorism data through
social media analysis of radicalized groups coupled with
post fact data of well-known terrorism cases. Together,
these formed a more comprehensive profile of extremist
and terrorist sociology that was used to develop con-
cepts in comparison with Foucault’s analytic of psychi-
atric power. Points of agreement and disagreement were
both actively sought in order to refine the hypothesis
generated.
Results of grounded theory analysis
In developing a substantive model for radicalization and
terrorism, data generation was subdivided into several
areas using Foucault’s analytic framework of psychiatric
power. From this, a preliminary hypothesis was pro-
posed, which was then further developed.
The online environment as an isolating influence
An obvious starting point for exploring the nature of the
online environment is its role in terrorist cases. Consider
Faisal Shahzad, the accused Time Square bomber. His
profile classifies him as a loner, only going out at night
and focusing on activities on his computer (also has uni-
versity background in computing) [14]. Likewise, Nidal
Hasan, the Fort Hood killer was also classified a very
quiet and was also found to have spent extensive time
on the internet [15]. Numerous other cases also support
extensive online engagement [9]. From these case stud-
ies the following hypothesis was generated:
 H1:The online environment becomes a self-imposed
institution, whereby individuals become isolated in
terms of developing rationalities.
Although, individuals in these terrorism cases were
not completely separated from the rest of the world, they
did exhibit a withdrawal from interaction with others.
The word institution was chosen because it specifically
captures the nature of this isolation. An institution has
walls and boundaries that separate it from the rest of the
world. Typical institutions that can powerfully reshape
individuals include prisons, schools and mental institu-
tions. In contrast to traditional institutions, the online
institution is one chosen by the individual rather than
one that a person is forced into.
In a search for disconfirming data, it was found that
the nature of institutions did vary and were not always
online. For example there were cases of small splinter
groups that first met in mosques such as the Detroit
Sleeper Cell [16] and the Benbrika Case [17]. Addition-
ally, prisons have also become another institution for
recruiting and radicalizing [16]. In addition, institutions
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coupled with online material such as the Madrid Train
Bombers [9]. Nonetheless, the online environment has
proven to be a salient institution for terrorism. There-
fore, the next point of investigation lies with describing
the nature of this institution.
Commentators have noted a move toward more open
online access to extremist material [18]. An analysis of
Facebook revealed that groups were set up with varying
levels of openness: open access, requested access and
hidden. As a general trend, more extreme groups tend
to be less open, thus layering access to the level of ex-
tremism on social media. However, there are disconfirm-
ing cases where extreme material has open access, but is
also reproduced; it seems with the expectation of having
this material deleted (See following subsection). Add-
itionally, members of extremist groups are cautioned
about being infiltrated by intelligence agents with warn-
ings posted.
Sample posts highlighting security concerns. Here a
number of sample posts illustrate the concern over view-
ing by intelligence agencies.
 [Do not accept or invite any more than 10 friends a
day] [VR05]
 [Just so everyone knows, some of you are coming up
as being online twice. Be careful I think they are
hacking our accounts. In particular, call to jihad
members] [SFA09]
 [Someone has hacked our group] [SFA08]
 [Allah protect out accounts] [PA08]
 [. . . then I’ll get disabled again in 2 or 3 weeks al
hamdulillah ala kulli kaal] [SFA08]
Source: Group pages including Voice of Islamic Resist-
ance 4
The number 4 after the name indicates that the page
has been previously shut down three times. What is also
very evident is the large number of Islamic extremist
groups and pages present on Facebook and these keep
reappearing even after being shut down.
Another issue in exploring the online institution is the
way that individuals interact with it. In exploring the link
between internet use and depression with terrorism, it is
difficult to make generalized comments. However, cases
do exist that link emotional issues, online use and terror-
ism. The most notable being Nidal Hasan whose profile
reveals that he was disturbed through his dealing with
veterans [15]. Similarly, Mohamed Mohamud (Portland
bomb plot) harbored high levels of anger and resent-
ment towards his family [19]. While, there has not been
any formal diagnosis of depression, these cases clearly
show that the perpetrators were disaffected and har-
bored emotional issues.The online environment used to influence thoughts and
behaviours
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of this inves-
tigation is the way that the online institution is used to
influence ways of thinking and ways of viewing the
world. Given the fact that many terrorist cases are corre-
lated with high exposure to the internet [9,14,15,20], the
following hypothesis was proposed:
 H2:The online environment is a critical mechanism
used by terrorists to change thoughts and behaviors,
with the specific aim of increasing radicalization.
Despite a strong correlation effect, establishing a
stronger cause and effect relationship through a better
understanding of mechanisms at work is more difficult.
In an attempt to explore these mechanisms, the focus
was on exploring social media data. Using Foucault’s
analytic as a guide, investigation centered on exploring
how forms of knowledge are transferred and propagated
as well as what dimensions of the soul, terrorists are tar-
geting (i.e. rational or affective). Media and in particular
social media are an important tool for the propagation
of the relationship between religion and terrorism [21].
Analysis of group pages revealed consistent discursive
schemas. Some key schemas are summarized in Table 1
There were a number of common themes that emerged.
First, extremists do not view themselves as the aggres-
sors, rather they merely respond to Western occupation
and aggression. Second, terrorist figures are esteemed
and regarded as hero’s and/or martyrs. Third, the unity
of Islam is a key discursive mechanism used to
normalize the actions of extremists and prevent alien-
ation from moderates. Further, it is used as a mechanism
to try and swing moderates toward more extreme think-
ing. Fourth, restoring the glory of Islam is a key goal and
is linked to the first point where it made clear that it is
Islam (not terrorism) that is being attacked by the West
and once again this seeks to unify Muslims. Finally,
extremists are keen to contrast their different views on
death to the West especially the concept of ‘dunya’
(Table 1). This list is by no means exhaustive but is does
illustrate that common discursive schemas can be found
across a wide variety of group pages.
In terms of targeting, the affective dimension is crucial
for fuelling extremist views. As a case in point, the Voice
of the Islamic Resistance 4 group page contains graphic
images of dead Muslims designed to incite anger. Add-
itionally, the choice of the word resistance is congruent
with the first point in Table 1 of the discursive schema,
Western oppression. Clearly, this discursive schema
(Table 1) is designed to target the affective dimension
highlighting that the West is against Islam. Another
source of inspiration is interaction with western people
Table 1 Discursive schemas on facebook
Discursive element Sample Postsa
Oppression/ Blaming of the West [There’s a 9/11 and 7/7 happening more than once a day in muslimb countries, afghanistan, pakistan, iraq,
palestine, chechneya, etc., etc.,] [UFWM0303]
[“Because of my Islamic conscience I could not just sit back and watch the Jews while they were shooting
the Muslims like someone shooting birds.” (12 year old boy)]
[Some more moderate elements subscribe to
conspiracy theories]
Quoted by [HGB0621]
[what about the killing of palestinian,bosnian. . . is it justified ?] [AA0313]
[OSAMA did not blow up the 2win towers them illuminati pple did it nd bush is 1 of them. 3.Osama isnt a
terrorist Americans, them Jew nd the british they kill thousands of our bros nd sis in iraq, gaza. . . 5.Osama
was a muslim my bro] [AA0309]
Defends actions of terrorists [Osama bin
Laden]
[islam is sweet, and yes it is not osama obviously, for he too is a servant of Allah who can say on the day
of judgement h. . . ow he helped other muslims, how he had raised the banner of islam, with no shame, for
look at how many witnesses he has for his actions] [UFWM 0307]
Unity of Islam [However he [bin Laden] is a brother in islam, and as muslims we are one body! where pain may hit one
part, affects the rest. You cannot judge, especially as you do not even begin to even try to understand our
religion, why do you think islam is the worlds greatest and fastest growing religion in the world.]
[UFWM0308]
Restoring the glory of Islam [and upholding islam, returning it to its glory, inshallah only by the will of Allah] [UFWM0311]
Embracing of death [Earth is a prison for believers and a paradise for unbelievers] [DF0601]
[We’re just a traveler in this dunyac and this dunya is just a trial for us.] [GBAM0603]
[O ALLAH GRANT ME MARTYRDOM IN YOUR PATH AND OCCUR MY DEATH IN THE CITY OF YOUR PROPHET.]
\HGB0608]
a. Sources: Facebook Group Pages linked to Sheikh Anwar Al Awlaki et. al.
b. Incorrect spellings and grammar of original posts have been left as is throughout the table.
c. Dunya is an Arabic word meaning ‘temporal world’.
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views. Here, westerners are allowed to discuss issues
and as the following subsection illustrates they are bai-
ted due to extremist support of Osama bin Laden and
other terrorists. Furthermore, extremists make it a war
against Islam and in a sense they win by stirring up the
Americans to be disrespectful to Allah, further reinfor-
cing their alienation (see last post on in the following
subsection).
Sample posts showing interactions to harden views.
Interactions show high levels of polarization.
 [You’re a stupid, ignorant sand nigger. Your buddy
osama is dead, your next towel-head.] [ER0328]
 [@ethan you r dead wrong OSAMA is not dead just
giving ya self alittle hope hahahaha!!!] [FI0329]
 [he is though. . . so? denial?] [ER0329]
 [Stop abusing sheikh anwar and Osama is a HERO
OUR HERO. Get it.] [FI0329]
 [You’re hypocrites. You think Americans are tyrants,
you beat your women, and blow yourselves up and
think your going to paradise.] [ER0330]
 [Wow wat about u superpowers yet you cant stop
storms from destroying you. Allah is punishing u for
your deeds you want 2 finish ISLAM No u cant just
fooling yo self.] [FI0330]
 [yo fatimah if you’re so tight with allah, once you
blow yourself up along with innocent men, womenand children in exchange for 72 dunegook virgins,
tell him i say go fuck yourself] [CC0331]
FI : Islamic extremist, ER and CC: Americans
Source: Facebook Group Page linked to Sheikh Anwar
Al Awlaki
The online environment allows for a more distributed
form of power
The targeting of training camps and the shift towards
online forms of recruitment and training has resulted in
a corresponding shift in power structures. This repre-
sents a shift towards more distributed network struc-
tures and a more ‘leaderless’ jihad [9,22]. Arid Uka is
just one such case of a loner terrorist [8]. Others such as
Tsouli start as isolated individuals and then become part
of a group [9]. Consequently, the following hypothesis is
proposed.
 H3: Online power relations follow a more
distributed network structure, rather than a top
down hierarchical structure.
Data from terrorist cases support this network struc-
ture without necessarily having specific forms of leader-
ship. Nonetheless, there are cases that show some
aberrance to this trend, most notably, the Benbrika case
[17]. Here, one individual was clearly identified as the
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there were no formal wider connections to a specific Is-
lamic terrorist group. This case demonstrates that in
small group structures there can exist a more formal
hierarchical power structure. Yet such a power structure
does not hold up well beyond small groups. Despite this,
such small seemingly disconnected groups are part of a
larger power structure or mechanism that warrants
investigation.
Use of discourse to maintain power
Evidence suggests that cohesion of world-wide Islamic
terrorism is maintained through discursive schemas.
While there are clearly divergences between groups,
each with its own particular ideology and focus, there
are important concepts or rationalities that unite them
to form the framework of this global power structure.
Table 1 illustrates some of these common discursive fea-
tures that have been collected from extremist groups on
Facebook. Researchers in the field of Islamic terrorism
will look at this table and see that it contains nothing
new. It simply recreates well known discursive fields.
However, this in and of itself is significant. The very fact
that researchers are able to easily and clearly recognize
common discursive elements of Islamic terrorism lend
support to a model that holds the discursive framework
as integral to the power structure of Islamic terrorism.
Islamic propaganda and discursive formations are ram-
pant on the internet; this is a well known fact. However,
this in and of itself is insufficient as a power structure to
create radicalization and terrorism. The internet is filled
with a vast variety of discursive schemas with many of
them regarded as nothing more than fiction. Essentially,
discursive schemas must be supported with some sort of
normalizing process. In other words, the discourse in
question must be presented as ‘normal’ and correct and
discourses that run counter to it as false and abnormal.
So the question becomes, how does this normalizing
process work? Social media analysis of groups provides
the best insights here.
Shifting the ‘norm’ to the radical extreme
After an initial focus on radical Islamic groups, I decided
to broaden my focus to also encompass more moderate
groups. This decision led to some significant findings.
Several moderate Islamic groups tended to have input
from more radical members. Consider the following ex-
ample in the following subsection that challenges the
views of a moderate. It seems that more radical Islamic
elements are searching out and trying to influence more
moderate Muslims thus shifting the normality of Muslim
discourse in the more extreme or radical dimension.
Note how the third post in the following subsection
seeks to shift the notion of ‘balance’.Sample posts showing the challenging of a moderate
by an extremist. Demonstrates a clear delineation with
Western media.
 [Osama was d reason y many muslims were called
terrorist] [SS0303]
 [ i think you have been brain washed by the media .
Listen before you say something you should think,
concerning osama you need 2 do more research as
to why he did that] [FI0322]
 [“Every muslim considers himself as balanced BUT
the balance is according to the Prophet sallallahu
alayhi wa salaama, so if he has participated in jihad
27 times in his life and we have not done this action
even once, how then can we say we are balanced
and that we follow the way of the Prophet sallallahu
alayhi wa salaamh” (Masood Al Benin).] [HGB0517]
Source: Facebook groups
a. A well-known Islamic prophet
Another important aspect of the normalizing process
is not just the discursive schemas but also where they
come from and who authors these discourses. As an off-
shoot of social media, the extreme ‘Inspire’ magazine
features articles from prominent terrorist leaders includ-
ing Usama bin Laden. Quotes from prominent prophets,
sheiks and terrorists are also common in Facebook
postings. Interestingly, these terrorist leaders share
certain physical characteristics as a symbol of their au-
thority. These include long beards and classic Islamic
robes. Such characteristics run contrary to much of the
modus operandi presented that recommends its terror-
ist operatives to ‘blend in’ to Western culture in all
aspects especially appearance. This paradox illustrates
the importance of symbolic authority in the discursive
formations of jihad. Additionally, group posts as illu-
strated below demonstrate high levels of respect for
sheiks and their discursive schemas.
Sample posts illustrating loyalty to radical sheiks.
Defending of extremist leaders is clearly evident here:
 [May Allah tala protect our sheikh and keep him
away from all evil and harm, May he make his
affairs easy for him ameen. When the disbeliever
plot and plan Allah too plans and plots against them
and Allah is the best of plotters and planners allahu
akbar] [SB0332]
 [Mansha Allah, sheikh Anwar al Awlki may Allah
reward him.] [AL0333]
 [salam, i just want us to know that victory is ours. i
have heard sheikhs but nothing like you. Allahs
promise is binding on Him and he will protect you
both in duniya and akhira INSHA ALLAHU. salam
and sakinah for you till we meet in Jannah either as
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[AS0334]
Source: Facebook groups linked to Anwar Al Awlaki
In spite of this symbolic authority, actual authority is
does not belong to any particular individual or cleric.
This is evident in social media groups that tend to focus
on the discourse rather than on the authority of particu-
lar terrorists or sheiks.
Discussion: developing an explanatory model of online
radicalisation
Having generated preliminary hypothesis and then fur-
ther investigated aspects covering the normalization of
radicalization and terrorism, it was confirmed that Fou-
cault’s analytic utilizing concepts of psychiatric power
was an invaluable guiding framework for developing an
explanatory model of online radicalization and terrorism.
Consequently, this section will outline in detail this
newly applied model in addition to some of its original
theoretical foundations.
Power is reconceptualized as a move away from the use
of force and coercion to affect change and a move towards
more carefully planned, subtle, methodical, tactical rou-
tines [3]. To parallel radical Islamic extremism, it is a shift
away from conversion by the sword, away from threats
and forced action, and a move towards a disciplined, sub-
tle and constant training; it is an immersion of the individ-
ual within this nebulous online context.
Although this online context has varying effects on dif-
ferent individuals with users having different motivations
for online social interaction and engagement [23], forms
of power are more subtle and widespread being a tech-
nique used to effect change. In other words, it is a method,
a means to alter the attitudes and behaviors of users. Of
course it is not always successful, but in the case of repro-
ducing terrorism it does not have to be. Even changes in
very small population sets can have devastating conse-
quences. So the key question arises, how do forms of
power work to promote radicalization and terrorism? This
will be answered by looking at the key elements of psychi-
atric power as it relates to this topic.
Self imposed isolation of individuals leads to
radicalization
To begin outlining this model, the internet or online en-
vironment will be contextualized an an institution. That
said, the institutional does not necessarily need the trad-
itional four walls, yet at the same time it does need to
possess certain characteristics that define it.
Social isolation
First, an institution does need to possess a degree of so-
cial isolation [3]. This isolation is critical for normalizingbehaviors and will be discussed in detail shortly. How-
ever, it is important to establish that this form of isola-
tion is not a type of solitude, but rather insulation from
pervasive outside influence, particularly alternative ideas
and competing rationalities. In the case of radicalization,
this seems to be a case of self imposed social isolation
where individuals spend large amounts of time online
engaging with radical materials.
Disciplined regularity
Second, an institution is a regulated and disciplined en-
vironment which stems historically from the ascetic
exercises of the monastic tradition [3]. Research illus-
trates that terrorist’s use of the internet parallels signifi-
cant levels of regularity and discipline. This ranges from
the use of the internet to coordinate and plan attacks as
well as recruit and train individuals [10]. Most import-
antly, terrorist activity of the internet reflects elements
of the master/servant type relationships of the monastic
tradition as well as the expert/trainee relationships from
the psycho-social sciences. A case in point are chat room
forums where ‘experts’ train others in the specific tac-
tical details of planning and conducting terrorist attacks
including bomb creation skills, ambush skills and com-
puter hacking [10].
Access to normalizing discourses
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly is the use of the
internet as an institution to normalize and reinforce
behaviors. Research indicates that online users often ac-
tively seek out those who support their views and also
interpret evidence in light of their belief and expecta-
tions [24]. Furthermore, this corroborating of opinion
and beliefs often causes increases in opinion extremity
[24]. This evidence, even if only true for a small sub-
group of the population, demonstrates the actual and
potential strength of the online institution in normaliz-
ing and strengthening attitudes and opinions. Other re-
search has also shown that the internet does not
increase participation in the political process [25], re-
inforcing its potential isolating affects. Overall, it is this
isolation that forms the foundation of the online
context.
Online environment as a castle
Perhaps one of the most salient symbols of institutional
isolation is that of the castle. Specifically, the isolation
and disciplinary regulation of a castle, its activities, time-
table and even its surroundings ‘imprints itself on the
brain.’ [3, p. 2]. Parallel to a physical castle, the internet
is like a self-imposed virtual castle, a self-imposed form
of isolation and training where one enters the institution
both willingly and with a habitual, some may even say
obsessive regularity. These virtual castles are particularly
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ratives more so than religious or theological rigor [9].
To some, the internet as a castle is counterintuitive to
what it represents, namely, diversity of opinion. While
exposure to multiple viewpoints is critical to promoting
diversity, group polarization is a phenomenon both in
real world and online contexts when group exposure to
debates simply results in the reinforcing of current
beliefs in addition to a shift towards a more extreme
position [24]. Group polarization stems from homophily,
where like-minded individuals seek each other out,
resulting in a mutual reinforcing of beliefs and opinions
[24]. This phenomenon is well suited to recruiting and
radicalizing individuals on the path to jihad and
terrorism.
Given this phenomenon of group polarization coupled
with the diverse and cosmopolitan nature of the internet,
we have an interesting paradox. A place with a multitude
of opinions and viewpoints while no doubt for some
leads to promoting tolerance and diversity, but for
others merely presents a choice of a multitude of self-
imposed castles or virtual institutions. These online
institutions are ready and waiting to reinforce current
beliefs and opinions and even take them to a more ex-
treme place. So the question arises, how do the disaf-
fected and marginalized find and enter these radical
Islamic virtual castles?
Previously, it was common for jihadi forums to be
closed and password protected, only allowing those
screened and chosen to enter [10]. Metaphorically, this
meant that the gates of the castle were closed. This
choice was made to protect those working within the in-
stitution from outsiders, namely intelligence agencies.
However, this also meant that not only were the gates
closed to unwanted intruders, they were also closed to
new and potential recruits which was a significant
disadvantage.
Access to online ‘castles’ of radicalization
Given the increasing emphasis on the use of Western
social media, there has been a corresponding shift in the
need to open up the virtual institution [10]. Many ter-
rorist organizations now have open Facebook groups,
which makes it much easier for radicals to enter these
virtual institutions without the previous restrictions [10].
In addition, many of these sites are becoming much
more media savvy, targeting and appealing to margina-
lized and disaffected youth. Despite these benefits, there
is also the increased risk that terrorist organizations face
of being infiltrated by intelligence agencies, and even
prominent jihadi figures have warned their members
and recruits about these potential dangers [10]. Never-
theless, given the enormous membership of social media
sites such as Facebook (more than 500 million activeusers) and Twitter (more than 40 million active users)
these are an important tool for finding and recruiting
subjects for the virtual castle. These facts, in conjunction
with the shift toward loner jihad wannabes targeting
heroic fantasies [9], make this risk a necessary one for
terrorist organizations to take.
Marginalized and disaffected individuals join interest
groups that allow terrorists to specifically target indivi-
duals in a manner similar to the way a marketing group
would target consumers [10]. Many of these are young
males and females who are socially isolated and hence
are seeking an identity. The danger here is that these
individuals are voluntarily entering a virtual castle with a
high degree of disciplined regularity. This disciplined or
obsessive regularity is better known as problematic inter-
net usage (PIU).
There have been a number of studies conducted on
PIU especially in relation to loneliness and isolation. In
terms of predictors of PIU on a group of university stu-
dents: loneliness, depression and computer self-efficacy
were the main predictors with loneliness then depression
being the most significant [26]. For a younger cohort of
secondary students, a strong relationship was found be-
tween hours of internet engagement and levels of loneli-
ness [27]. This relationship in itself is problematic;
nonetheless, other research studies also suggest that a
negative spiral can occur. Those who were lonely or had
poor social skills could develop PIU and this in turn had
negative impacts on lifestyle factors such as home,
school, work and relationships leading in further social
isolation and loneliness [28]. Another study also sup-
ported the link between high internet use and poor so-
cial ties [29]. Consequently, those most likely to enter
the obsessive regularity of the virtual castle are also
those most vulnerable with problematic psychological
antecedents. Others have also found that PIU is asso-
ciated with low psychological wellbeing [23].
To further elaborate on the vulnerability of the disaf-
fected, online interaction becomes a form of compensa-
tion for an individual’s poor social skills [28]. Furthermore,
the freedom of online interaction without the need for
non-verbal cues often compounds the problems of real
world interactions reinforcing the attraction of internet
usage [23]. Unfortunately such individuals, in addition to
those who shown sympathy to terrorist causes, are par-
ticularly vulnerable for recruitment and training given that
they actually prefer online interaction.
The online environment is an important context to
normalise radical thinking and behavior
Once terrorists have targeted sympathizers, the vulnerable
or disaffected, their next task is to achieve a transform-
ation; to ‘normalize’ the way in which they should think
and ultimately act. Discipline and regularity are essential
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Online users achieve this order and socialization through
their own regular or compulsive internet use that has a
narrow focus on a particular group of rationalities.
A key aspect of engagement is facilitating the individual
to self-disclose; however this is a very natural process on-
line, with the internet promoting higher levels of self dis-
closure [23]. Furthermore, online users are generally more
uninhibited [23], making them increasingly subject to forms
of power. Specifically, this allows individuals to better self
monitor and regulate their own behaviors using self subjec-
tification [4]. Here individuals can compare their own fra-
meworks against those of the extremist or terrorist group.
Group polarization
Homophily and group polarization are important con-
cepts where like-minded individuals seek each other out
and further strengthen their mindsets and even take them
to more extreme levels [24]. A key dynamic of group
polarization is group identity where individuals categorize
themselves and others as in-group or out-of-group [24].
Group identification is particularly salient in political and
ideological contexts [24]. For terrorist or extremist groups,
this group identity is particularly important where indivi-
duals continually compare themselves against group cate-
gorizations and norms. Furthermore, threats to group
identity tend to strengthen the homogeneity of the group
[24]. This is particularly the case with terrorist groups,
many of which highlight threats to their identity such as
war crimes and maltreatment, bombing of civilians, as
well as cases of discrimination and prejudice. Equally dan-
gerous to strengthening group identity is the publication
of victories against terrorists who are subsequently turned
into heroes and martyrs [9]. Therefore, a strong group
identity is imperative within the virtual institution.
Social media forums are battlegrounds for the hearts
and minds of the vulnerable and disaffected. In fact the
key to the success of radicalization is the victory of one
idea over another [3]. This is an important objective of
online radicalization, to replace moderate ideas with ex-
treme ideals. Sageman is adamant that this is a battle for
the hearts and minds of young Muslims which regularly
go online to share their dreams and grievances [9].
Moreover, this is where terrorists attempt to suppress
the realities and horrors of war and replace them with
fantasy and heroic narratives [9]. These narratives are
designed to give purpose, fulfillment and glory, in
addition to providing an avenue for their grievances.
What is particularly critical about these narratives is the
way they capture the affective dimension.
Targeting the affective dimension
Monitoring and dealing with feelings is just as important
as analyzing thoughts with many psychotherapeuticapproaches also targeting the affective dimension [4].
Critically, for terrorists, Sageman argues that the affective
dimension is more important than the rational dimension
in explaining behavior and further links actions to a type
of moral outrage over perceived injustices [9]. What is
more concerning is that the virtual castles found through
online social media are important forums to discuss
issues that involve emotional triggers [24]. This is par-
ticularly so around political or controversial issues. These
provide an important opportunity for terrorist recruiters
to play on the feelings of disaffected young Muslims, with
the aim of engendering radical feelings of injustice and
hatred. To achieve this goal, terrorist leaders and radical
clerics have carefully devised schemas or frameworks
which they exercise.
Schemas of knowledge
A key aspect of normalizing behavior is the development
of a prescriptive schema where forms of knowledge are
combined with training, surveillance, monitoring and
testing to ensure their adaptation by those within the in-
stitution [3]. In the case of institutions, frameworks of
knowledge and expectations are developed about how to
behave. In addition, these schemas were not value free
but leaders have a clear body of theoretical knowledge
about normality and how abnormality needs to be
addressed [4]. In the virtual institution, radical Islamic
leaders use their extreme views as the prescriptive
schema that impose order, training and discipline upon
those within this social media institution. Perhaps one of
the most famous terrorists to make use of this concept
was Younis Tsouli, also known as Terrorist 007, who
produced a multitude of YouTube propaganda videos
[10]. These videos were specifically designed to impose
forms of knowledge about the path of jihad.
An important element in making up schemas is the
concept of dispersion. This concept recognizes that di-
verse ideas make up a body of knowledge. A case in
point is the concept of jihad that has a variety of diver-
gent interpretations. However, a schema can and is still
created by recognizing that: different variations make up
a single discursive object; statements that make up a dis-
course are organized by form and connection; discourse
is determined by more permanent and coherent con-
cepts; and statements are grouped and regrouped
according to themes [7]. The key point here is that ex-
tremist schemas while diverse are marked by prominent
themes and persistent concepts that are echoed by many
leaders and groups.
The distributed nature of power in the online
environment helps the process of radicalization
Power to radicalize, in addition to being founded on
schemas of knowledge, is a very meticulous and
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disciplined and sophisticated routines rather than brute
force [3]. This is critical in online environments as
maintaining extremist or terrorist recruits is a difficult
process, it is often gradual and slow. Also, although key
leaders may be influential, power is not possessed by
any individual; it is a circular relation that flows
through many networks and individuals that make up
that network [3]. Essentially, it is perfectly suited to the
online environment. Further, this dispersion of hier-
archies allows for a more tactical functioning of power
[3], and is well suited to terrorist causes.
The illusion of servanthood
To explore this tactical functioning further, it is neces-
sary to explore the illusion of servant hood. Terrorists
on many online forums appear as servants giving their
fellow radicals any assistance with tactical tools or moral
support they need in order to carry out the global jihad.
Fundamentally, what often occurs is high ranking and
experienced terrorists become the servant of the novice
radical while simultaneously exercising a form of power
over them through their disciplined training regimes and
schemas of radicalized thinking. As a consequence, new
radicals become embedded within a framework of
power. It is the locating within this framework of power
that is critical in order for such power to be effective at
transforming behaviors [3].
Slow, structured and disciplined form of power
When locating an individual within a framework of
power, it is imperative not to conceptualize this as a re-
pressive or controlling form of power. Rather, psychiatric
power is a structured and productive power aimed at
normalizing thoughts and behaviors contained within an
institutions schema of knowledge [4]. Clearly, repressive
forms of power would be very ineffective given the
structure and dynamics of the online environment.
However, a productive power that works in a subtle,
regular and disciplined fashion is well suited to a net-
work environment. To become effective this productive
power must be created by what Foucault terms an ‘ap-
paratus of power’ [3, p. 13].
The relationship between power and discourse
The key question in devising a framework is ‘. . . to what
extent can an apparatus of power produce statements,
discourses and, consequently, all the forms of represen-
tation that may then derive from it?’ [3, p 13]. Overall, it
is discourse that is the true leader of the online jihad [9].
Such discourses have been created by an apparatus of
power and now seek to encompass all who enter the vir-
tual castle. This apparatus of power seeks to suppress al-
ternative forms of discourse that can compete orundermine it [7]. In the case of jihad, notions such as
peace, compromise and moderacy must all be sup-
pressed and categorized as ills while notions such as vic-
tory, war, martyrdom and sacrifice must be embraced.Power does not belong to an individual
A final point on the flow of power is the disindividuali-
sation of power. This is where power is decentered and
not focused on one individual [4]. Online jihads are
inspired, taught and trained by a wide variety of radical
clerics, terrorists and terrorist groups. Despite this disin-
dividualisation of power coupled with the circular and
network relations of power, still present are forms of
power dissymmetry through recognized symbolic au-
thority [3]. In the traditional asylum, doctors symbolized
their authority through a variety of physical features
such as long white coats, white hair, expressive voice
and prominent features [3]. For the online jihad, clerics
also maintain a form of authority through physical ap-
pearance such as long beards, wearing of robes and the
strong aggressive tone of voice. These forms of authority
are a critical part of the apparatus of power that create
the dominant schemas of knowledge use to regulate
thoughts and behavior.Conclusion
Given the rise of the online jihad as the third wave of
radicals [9], it is critical to gain an understanding of the
mechanisms of this process of radicalization. Through a
grounded theory analysis of both terrorist cases and so-
cial media sites promoting jihad, Foucault’s analytic on
psychiatric power provides a solid analytical model for
this process. Additionally, aspects of this model are also
supported by findings from other researchers. In particu-
lar, this model encompasses the discourses of power and
their interrelationship with schemas of knowledge that
are carefully combined to normalize behavior. It is this
transformation of ideology and behavior that is critical
for producing terrorist acts. Of most concern is the way
that radical Islamic elements seek to influence and trans-
form more moderate and disaffected individuals includ-
ing those within more moderate group forums.
Given the difficulty of data collection and the ‘gap’ be-
tween online radicalization and post terrorism case data,
any model developed should be viewed as a partial, yet
significant step in understanding the mechanisms that
result in an individual or group undertaking terrorist
acts. This paper has given another perspective that can
add to the growing body of research on perhaps the
most important tool used by Islamic extremists: the
internet and in particular social media. Clearly, more re-
search is needed in this vital area with the need to fur-
ther explore mechanisms of radicalization and de-
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extremism and terrorism.
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